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Colloquium Brief
U.S. Army War College,
Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University

A NEW CHAPTER IN TRANS-AMERICAN
ENGAGEMENT
Dr. Max G. Manwaring
Strategic Studies Institute
Ms. Eva Silkwood Baker
Institute for National Strategic Studies

KEY INSIGHTS:
• T
 he need to advance regional understanding of the contemporary security partnership situation in
the Hemisphere: An educational and conceptual requirement;
• T
 he need to foster a broader partnership focus on the disaster relief issue: An educational, conceptual, and organizational requirement; and
• T
 he need to build multilateral mechanisms and processes to address the contemporary security
partnership situation: An educational and organizational requirement.
• R
 ecommendation: USSOUTHCOM take the lead in developing a multilateral regional security action plan to begin a viable long-term regional partnership effort in the Hemisphere.

INTRODUCTION
General Fraser and the conference dialogue stressed the critical need to develop a serious hemispheric partnership
for opening “A new Chapter in Trans-American Engagement.” In that connection, over 20 major issues and recommendations were put forward (some of which were redundant) at the 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium,
held on May 25-26, 2010, in Miami, Florida. In one way or another, virtually every issue and recommendation stresses
that building a viable regional security partnership in the Hemisphere is not a strictly short-term, or unilateral, or
even bilateral defense effort. Regional security will result only from long-term, multilateral, civil-military partnering
efforts. Thus, the generalized results of the colloquium emphasize three highly interrelated needs and an associated
recommendation.
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Issue A: The Need to Advance Regional Understanding of the Contemporary Security Partnership Situation in the
Hemisphere.
This is primarily an educational and conceptual requirement that centers on the major unconventional contemporary transnational threats to effective sovereignty, peace, democracy, socio-economic development, and individual
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law enforcement agents to work with their partner nation equivalents. This is a “force multiplier.”
9. The U.S. Government should promote peopleto-people diplomacy in collaboration with NGOs and
PVOs through such initiatives as the medical missions of
the USNS Comfort in partnership with Project Hope. The
U.S. Government should also work to engage the private
sector and civil society through “intersections of interest” to mobilize volunteers and obtain funding for socioeconomic development projects in the region.
10. Finally, Western Hemisphere countries must be
encouraged to be proactive in providing their own security in partnership with their neighbors. This will require
meaningful participation in decisionmaking and meaningful roles in implementation.

and collective security. Recommendations include, but
are not necessarily limited to the following:
1. Western Hemisphere countries should reevaluate traditional understandings of state sovereignty and
defense. The purpose is to reconceptualize concepts of
sovereignty, defense, and security to meet 21st century
requirements, and to generate truly transnational responses to transnational problems.
2. Western Hemisphere countries need to develop
whole-of-society solutions to achieve individual and collective security, and to achieve effective sovereignty.
3. There is a corresponding need to improve education, training, knowledge transfer, and support to public
security administrative officials (civilian, military, and
police). As one example, the intent is to better use police,
military, and civilian capabilities in a cohesive manner—
fusing information into actionable intelligence—and
helping them to work together operationally.
4. Civil-military relationships need public debate,
and new Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be developed.
5. U.S. policymakers and their Latin American partners need to better coordinate their separate, subregional counternarcotics and security programs (e.g., Plan
Colombia, Merida Initiative, Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative, and the Central American Regional Security
Initiative) in order to be more effective in meeting the
transnational challenges posed by organized criminal
networks, and avoid simply perpetuating “the balloon
effect.”
6. As a corollary, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM
must work together in a more cooperative manner
in the Southern Triangle areas of Mexico, Belize, and
Guatemala to combat illicit activities such as drug, arms,
and human trafficking.
7. U.S. policymakers should readjust their metrics of
success. U.S. assistance programs should no longer be
gauged on the amount of money or military equipment
doled out, or illegal drugs seized, hectares eradicated, or
on domestic consumption rates. Instead the focus should
be on qualitative measures such as provision of citizen
security and political stability. Most importantly, the
focus needs to be pragmatic, with the more reasonable
goal of management of the situation, not complete victory in a so-called “war on drugs.”
8. Government-to-Government collaboration is best
enabled through people-to-people diplomacy. For example, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence personnel should work on cultivating personal relationships
with their counterparts in Latin America to build trust
and to facilitate better sharing of information. The U.S.
Government should also support measures that employ
partner national level special and vetted units that work
with U.S. agencies and a program that encourages U.S.

Discussion.
In the context outlined above, it is helpful to understand how sovereignty, security, stability and defense
issues have changed over the past several years. The
traditional legal concept of threats to national security
and sovereignty involve the protection of national territory and the population against recognizable external
military aggression. Thus, the traditional level of security analysis tends to define national security and sovereignty in narrow nation-state and military terms. The
main current in the Latin American threat environment
is not a traditional security (i.e., defense against external
nation-state aggression) problem. Rather, a dynamic and
complex mix of nonstate actors (e.g., populists and neopopulists, new socialists, political insurgents, transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, small private
military organizations, enforcer gangs, mercenaries, other paramilitary “self defense” organizations, etc.) are actively involved in internal disruption and destabilization
efforts that violate the effective sovereignty and stability
of virtually every nation-state in the region, every day of
the year. The primary objective of these “new” players in
the hemispheric security arena is to attain a level of freedom of movement and action that allows their achievement of radical political, commercial, and/or other motives. Additionally, other potentially destabilizing issues
have emerged or reemerged in the hemisphere, such as
energy resources, missile defense, nuclear power, demarcation of boundaries, and informal economics.
The objectives of the players, nonstate and statesupported, define insurgency as: coercing fundamental
change of a given political-economic-social system to
neutralize, control, or depose it. These objectives also
define war: compelling an adversary to accede to an aggressor’s policy objectives. All this requires more than
law enforcement or military solutions. The ability to
effectively deal with contemporary insurgency or war
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and former SOUTHCOM Commander, General John
R. Galvin, USA (Ret.), argues that continuous and cooperative planning among and between national and
international civilian and military organizations, beginning with a strategic assessment of a given situation, can
establish a mechanism for developing a common vision
for ultimate political success (i.e., strategic clarity). Then,
shared goals and objectives, a broad understanding of
what must be done, or not done or changed, and a common understanding of possibilities and constraints will
generate an overarching campaign plan that becomes
the basis for developing subordinate plans making direct contributions to the achievement of the desired end
state. Thus, the roles and missions of the various national and international civilian and military elements
evolve deliberately—rather than as an ad hoc response
to the crisis of the moment. All these integrative efforts
ultimately ensure the conditions that will allow a host
nation to develop or renew its political solvency and legitimacy—and that a given mandate for peace and stability will, in fact, be achieved.  

threats engendered by nonstate actors is multilevel and
multilateral, and requires political, psychological, moral,
informational, economic, and social efforts—as well as
police and military efforts. Thus, the full human and
physical resources of a nation-state, its society, and its
international partners are required to achieve the individual and collective well-being that leads to effective
sovereignty, stability, and societal peace with justice.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the concept of security now includes—first and foremost—the imperative
of addressing the root causes (i.e., poverty, inequality,
and the lack of law and order) of instability and violence.
Issue B: The Need to Foster a Broader Partnership
Focus on the Disaster Relief Issue.
This is a conceptual, educational, and organizational
requirement that focuses on the need for strategic clarity.
Strategic clarity is derived primarily from conceptual,
educational, and organizational mechanisms for achieving unity of effort. Recommendations include, but are
not necessarily limited to the following:
1. Disaster response and relief should focus on partnerships and relationships that look beyond traditional
command and control boundaries and instead allow for
coordination, collaboration, communication, and flexibility.
2. The UN Security Council should be encouraged to
reexamine its MINUSTAH mission to allow for the expansion of its mandate to include combating drug trafficking around Hispanola, and trans-national criminal
organizations and gangs on the island.
3. It is time to investigate why JIATF South is such a
successful model of inter-agency cooperation and how it
can best be optimized in other arenas of whole-of government and multi-lateral cooperation.
4. There is a need to work on building trust, confidence, transparency, and accountability in disaster relief
and related activities.
5. Same as recommendations 1 and 10 from Issue A
outlined above.

Issue C: The Need to Build Multilateral Mechanisms
and Processes to Address the Contemporary Partnership
Security Situation in Latin America.
Logically, Issues A and B take us to this issue. Before
rushing to create an architecture that will deal with security and stability threats that have an impact on us all,
the primary parties must be in general agreement regarding a strategic end state. Although an agreement on
the end state is a necessary condition for effective partnership, it is not sufficient. The agreement must be supported by an organizational structure that can identify,
plan, and implement a plan of action. Recommendations
include all those listed above, and more. First, there are
educational/conceptual requirements necessary to develop leader judgment that is needed to effectively deal
with complex, politically dominated, multi-dimensional,
multi-organization, multi-national, and multi-cultural
contingencies. In these terms, there is a need to:
1. Facilitate ways and means to help civil-military
leaders cope with the many ways that political and psychological considerations affect the use and the nonuse
of force.
2. Facilitate ways and means to help leaders to understand that the number of battlefield victories, the
number of enemies arrested or killed, or the number of
hectares or kilos destroyed has meaning only to the extent that such actions directly contribute to the legitimate
strengthening of the state.
3. Teach leaders at all levels how to communicate
with a diversity of national and external civil-military
cultures.

Discussion.
In the past, small-scale peace enforcement and stability operations tended to be unrealistically viewed as providing military solutions for civil violence and instability
problems. Presently, the complex realities of these types
of missions must be understood as a holistic process that
relies on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion. The
intent is to establish and achieve a common political end.
A former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
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global security arena. Thus, the continuing U.S. responsibility to the region goes well beyond the narrow purview
of unilateral military training and equipping to that of
a broader multilateral strategy and civil-military leader
development effort.

4. Teach leaders how to cooperatively and to collegially plan and implement an operation employing a full
universe of diverse organizations—internal government
agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, private voluntary organizations, and coalition/partnership civil-military organizations.
5. Teach leaders a thinking process (i.e., logic path)
and an understanding of grand strategy that will allow
them to be clear on what the situation is and what it is
not.
6. Since in a conflict situation, nonstate actors are
likely to have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional and unconventional weaponry, there is a need
to teach leaders, soldiers, and police involved in peace
enforcement and stability operations to be effective
warfighters.
7. Revitalization of the Inter-American Defense
Board might be a step in the right direction to work toward achieving the ends outlined above, to enhance civilian oversight of the armed forces in the region, to become a school of public administration instead of just a
training school for officers, and to help restore trust and
confidence in the armed forces and Ministries of Defense
in the region.

FINAL ISSUE: The Need to Continue the Momentum
from the Colloquium and to Build on the Range of
Partnership-related Issues Outlined in this Conference
Brief.
Sub-Issue: None of the requirements and recommendations outlined above allow for quick and easy solutions.
They demand a carefully staffed and phased multilateral
security action plan, with short and long-term milestones
and metrics to validate planning and implementation.
Recommendation: That the U.S. Southern Command
takes the lead in establishing a multi-organizational and
multilateral “Tiger Team” to develop a phased regional
action plan that will begin a viable long-term regional
partnership effort in the Hemisphere.
ENDNOTE
1. Manwaring interview with General John R. Galvin,
USA (Ret.), on August 6, 1997, in Boston, MA.

Organizationally, there is a need to:
1. Develop an executive-level management structure
which can and will ensure continuous cooperative planning and execution of policy among and between the
primary internal players. The Organization of American
States (OAS) could provide such a structure.
2. That structure must also be capable of continuous
cooperative planning and execution of policy among
and between primary external actors (i.e., primary external ally, other coalition partners, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.
3. That same structure must also ensure that all political-economic-military action at the operational and
tactical levels directly contributes to the achievement
of the mutually agreed strategic political end state. This
requirement reflects a need to develop an effective end
state planning mechanism within the executive-level
management structure.

*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Army, the Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s homepage at
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

Discussion.
The United States shares with its hemispheric neighbors an increasingly and vitally important financial,
commercial, and security/stability stake in the political
and socio-economic growth of the region. Any kind of
political-economic-social-security deterioration in the
area will profoundly degrade the health of the U.S. economy—and therefore, the concomitant power to act in the
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